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THE EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY FOR THE ACTS OF HIS INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR WHEN THE WORK IS INHERENTLY DANGEROUS
At first it was thought that the doctrine of respondeat supernor applied with
equal force to the relationship of employer and independent contractor.' This
position was soon attacked and overthrown on at least three grounds. One was
that it came to be recogmzed that the employer did not have the same degree
of control over the independent contractor and ins servants as he did over his
own servants.' The servants of the independent contractor were not the servants
of the employer even though it was his work that they were doing. A second
ground is that it is contrary to public policy to make the employer liable for the
acts of the independent contractor s servants, that is, to make one person liable
for the acts of another s servants.' A third is that the employer has a right to
rely on the presumption that the contractor will discharge Is legal duties owing
to his employees and thrd persons.' Thus, we have amved at the basic rule
that an employer is not to be made to answer for the negligent acts of his inde-
pendent contractor or the latter s servants.
However, as have many rules, this one has its exceptions. Among these are
situations where the employer is negligent himself;' or where the nmusance or
trespass is a necessary result of the doing of the work itself;' or where the work
is unlawful and the work is the proximate cause of the injury;" or where the plans
and specifications are defective and the defects can in some way be traced to the
negligence of the employer, as where he has been negligent in his selection of
an architect.' The exception under consideration here is that m which the work
to be done is inherently dangerous. When the work is so classified, the employer
will be liable. In such instances, the employer is under a non-delegable duty
to see that the work is done with due care.'
A prime reason for imposing liability upon the employer when such work is be-
ing done, despite the employer and independent contractor relationship, is that the
employer is receiving the benefit of the work and thus it is not inequitable to
impose liability upon him for the harm caused to another when the work is
fraught with danger.'"
'Lowell v. Boston & L. R. Corp., 23 Pick. (Mass.) 24, 84 Am. Dec. 33 (1839);
Stone v. Cheshire R. Corp., 19 N. H. 427, 51 Am. Dec. 192 (1849).
2 Hilsdorf v. St. Louis, 45 Mo. 94, 100 Am. Dec. 352 (1869); Aldritt v. Gillette-
Herzog Mfg. Co., 85 Minn. 206, 88 N.W 741 (1902).
3 Kellogg v. Payne, 21 Iowa 575 (1866); Wiswall v. Brinson, 10 Ired. L. 554, 556
(32 N. C. 399, 400) (1849).
4 Georgia Power Co. v. Gillespie, 49 Ga. App. 788, 176 S.E. 786, 789 (1934); Kaw
Boiler Works v. Frymeyer, 100 Okla. 81, 227 Pac. 453 (192W11 O'Connor v. Narragan-
sett Electric Co., 54 R. I. 317, 172 Atl. 889 (1934).
1;Ferguson v. Ashkenazy, 307 Mass. 197 29 N.E. 2d 823 (1940).
"Stout Lumber Co. v. Reynolds, 175 Ark. 988, 1 S.W. 2d 77 (1928).
7Fr edman v. Pacific Outdoor Advertising Co., 74 Cal. App. 2d 946, 170 P 2d 67
(1946); Wilbur v. Wlute, 98 Me. 191, 56 Atl. 657 '1903).
"Tooker v. Lonky, 106 N. J. L. 110, 147 Atl. 445 (1929); Burke v. Ireland, 26
App. Div. 487, 50 N. Y. Supp. 369 (1898).
See in connection 27 A,,r. JUR. sec. 39 p. 517 (1940).
"'Covington & C. Bridge Co. v. Stembrock, 61 Ohio St. 215, 55 N.E. 618 (1899).
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The initial impression may perhaps be that even so this is rather harsh when
it is considered that the employer has very little, if any, control over the means
and methods by which the work is to be done. Nevertheless, -it must be remem-
bered that it is the employer who, in the beginning, orders the work done, and he
has therefore complete freedom to select the person with whom he shall contract.
It may be assumed that in the vast majority of instances a truly competent con-
tractor will take precautionary measures to counteract any inherent danger, and
that the employer is free to select a contractor of good repute.
Although it is true, of course, that the employer receives the benefit of the
work, orders it done, and can choose his contractor even in situations where
liability is not imposed on him, the reason for imposing liability when danger
inheres in the work is the difference in the degree of probability of harm resulting.
Where there is slight chance of harm, even if the work is done negligently, the
employer will not be liable as this would fall within the basic rule; but where
harm is exceedingly likely to happen if precautionary measures are not taken,
he will be held liable if harm ensues therefrom.
Another reason which is sometimes given for imposing liability " is the
duty of due consideration which one in a civilized community owes to his fellows
and to the public, which duty precludes the ordering of that which if done will
be inherently dangerous. "" Precautionary steps must be taken if the employer
is to protect himself from liability.
In order to hold the employer liable under the inherently dangerous under-
taking doctrine, it is not altogether clear whether it is necessary that the par-
ticular catastrophe which was extremely likely to happen did occur," or whether
some accident was extremely likely to happen if due care were not taken, regard-
less of what particular injury did occur." It is submitted that the proper inter-
pretation is that the particular catastrophe which was extremely likely to result
from the work must be the one that actuallv occurred; the catastrophe having
happened, then any damage or injury proximately resulting therefrom will give
rise to a cause of action.
Before the work can be called inherently dangerous and thus impose liability
upon the employer, there must be more than just a possibility or recognized
chance of injury resulting. The mere fact that someone might be hurt if a
workman is negligent does not in itself make the employer liable. There must be
something in the very nature of the work so that in the natural course of things
injuries must be expected to arise unless care is taken. A recogmzable and sub-
stantial danger inherent in the work is requisite. The resulting event must be
the " ' direct, likely, probable, naturally to be expected result either of the
work itself or of the required manner of doing it.' ... Inherent danger in an
undertaking is danger that results directly from the work to be done, danger that
is an intrinsic and integral part of the work to be done or of the prescribed
manner of doing it, and is not the danger originating in the collateral negligence
"Montgomery v. Gulf Refining Co. of Louisiana, 168 La. 73, 121 So. 578, 581
(1929).
"See note, 18 A. L. R. 816, 817, 818 (1922).
"See note 9 supra.
MECHEM, OuiLINis OF THlE LAW or Ac.rcy sec. 510 (3d ed. 1923).
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of the contractor." It is necessary that the danger involved be much more than
that wherein there is just a chance of harm resulting; yet, it is something less
than that situation wherein the work and the injury really coincide because the
work cannot be done without a trespass. The employer is held responsible for
his failure to take or see to it that proper precautionary measures are taken
against the consummation of this high degree of danger.
To cite a few cases at random will perhaps illustrate the difficulty involved
in classifying the given undertaking as inherently dangerous. Repairing awmngs
on a building adjacent to a busy public way has been held to be inherently
dangerous." So has painting a sign over a sidewalk." In Philadelphia, B. & W R.
Co. v. Mitchell," the employer was held liable when it had a contractor build
a bridge over a highway. On the other hand, the employment of an independent
contractor for the purpose of putting up," or taking down' signs, painting shutters
of a house,"' or painting a building from a scaffold attached to a cormice above
the sidewalk,' has been held not to involve undertakings inherently dangerous.
A North Carolina case' resulted in a finding that constructing a reinforced con-
crete bridge over a city street was not inherently dangerous. Washing store
windows, even though in such a manner that soapy water runs onto the sidewalk,
is not inherently dangerous.'
In the case of Nahm & Friedman v. Register Newspaper Co., ' the Kentucky
court quotes with favor from the opimon of the Wisconsin court in Wertheimer v.
Sanders' on this topic in this manner:
"If an injury might be anticipated as a direct or probable
consequence of the performance of work contracted for, unless reason-
able care be used, the negligence of the contractor or his employees
will be chargeable to the person for whom the work is done, and the
latter will be held liable accordingly."
This the writer interprets to mean, in accordance with the rule, that the
contractor s negligence will be chargeable to the employer because the employer
has failed to perform his responsibility of seeing that precautionary measures
are taken
The case of Robinson v. WebbV concerned an employer who was having a
house built on a city lot. During the construction, a wall fell against a neighbor s
"-St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway v. Yanley, 53 Ark. 503, 13 S.W
333 (1890); Davis v. John L. Whiting & SON Co., 201 Mass. 91, 87 N.E. 199 (1909):
Rsrarxui rfNt, 'loRis sec. 427 (1934) (especiallh where it is said "The liability stated
in this section extends only to harm which is caused by the failure so to act as to
minimize to the uttermost the danger inherent in the nature of the work or in the
instrunentalities used.").
1' McHarge v. Newcomer & Co., 117 Tenn. 595. 100 S.W 700 (1907).
17 Richman Bros. Co. v. Miller, 131 Ohio St. 424, 3 N.E. 2d 360 (1936).
'107 Md. 600, 69 Ad. 422 (1908).
. cNultv v. Ludwig 125 App, Div. 291, 109 N. Y Supp. 703 (1908).
Pr', v. l'enny, 242 Mo. 98, 145 S.W 458 (1912).
D Iavis v. John L. Whiting Co., 201 Mass. 91, 87 N.E. 199 (1909).
"'Weilbacher v. J. w. Putts Co.. 123 Md. 249, 91 At. 343 (1914).
Gadsden '. Craft & Co., 173 N. C. 418. 92 S.E. 174 (1917).
-Sivearsky v. Stanley Dry Goods Co.. 122 Conn. 7, 186 AtI. 556 (1936).
120 Ky. 485, 491, 87 S.W. 296 (1905).
'95 Wis. 573. 70 NA 82f (1897).
:7t Ky. 46-1 (1875).
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building. The case was prosecuted on the nuisance theory, and the employer
was held not liable. This was not a nuisance because it was a lawful and proper
use of the land, done under proper plans, and by a competent contractor. If the
work had been done properly, no damage could have resulted. The same result
should be reached by application of the inherently dangerous undertaking test,
since the falling of a wall of a house under construction certainly is not inherent
in the work of construction or of the required and proper manner of doing it.
In another case of a falling wall' the plaintiff was an employee of the in-
dependent contractor. Due to the walls being extended too high before the
second floor joists were put in and because of bad mortar, one of the walls fell
on the worker. The employer was held not liable, following the rule of the
employer s non liability for the independent contractor's negligence.
However, a different result could perhaps be reached where a wall of a
fire-destroyed building is being torn down. Such a case is A. H. Bowman & Co. v.
Williams-' where the wall in question was 50 feet high and only three feet from
a house. The wall buckled while being razed and fell against the house. A resi-
dent of the house sued both the employer and the contractor. The lower court
found for the employer and the plaintiff chose not to appeal the decision. This
would seem to have been a good time to apply the doctrine- and hold the em-
ployer liable.'
Nevertheless, in Engel v. Eureka Club,' wherein a ruined wall was being
taken down, the court ruled that the undertaking was not inherently dangerous.
However, in this case the wall was only 16 feet high, and there was a driveway
along the side of it. These different circumstances may well be the answer to
the difference between the suggested decision in the Kentucky case and the
decision in the New" York case.
The doctrine is equally applicable to the relationship of contractor and
subcontractor. Young & Humphrey v. Trapp' is an example. The servant of a
subcontractor negligently dropped a brick upon a passerby on the sidewalk two
stones below. Since the work was being done adjacent to a public sidewalk in
Louisville and no barricades had been erected, the court found for the plaintiff
against the contractor on the basis of a nuisance. Here again the same result
might have been obtained under the doctrine. The injurious probalilities from
construction of a building adjacent to a public sidewalk in a large city are well
imaginable.
A good statement and application of the doctrine can be found in Nashville
Bridge Co. v. Marsh."' There the employer had constructed a water tower and
had built an inside scaffold to aid in doing the work. A workman, employed by
the contractor who had been engaged to take the scaffold down, was injured when
it collapsed. The court said that the scaffold was erected at a place where its
removal was not necessarily attendant with danger to third persons in the
vicinity. (However that may be, it could still be inherently dangerous to the
2sBellamy v. The F. A. Ames Co., 140 Ky. 98, 130 S.W 980 (1910).
231 Ky. 433, 21 S.W. 2d 790 (1929).
*Accord, Dillon v. Hunt, 105 Mo. 154, 16 S.W 516 (1891); Covington & C.
Bridge Co. v. Steinbrock, 61 Ohio St. 215, 55 N.E. 618 (1899) (wherein an extensive
discussion of the doctrine is to be fotind).
137 N. Y. 100, 32 N.E. 1052 (1803).
118 Ky. 813, 82 S.W. 429 (1904).
-I212 Ky. 728, 279 SA 1099 (1926).
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workman.) There was some hazard, of course, the court went on to say, but the
plaintiff assumed the risks consequent upon its proper removal by his employer.
The work was of such a nature that the defendant could delegate it without tak-
ing precautionary measures of its own.
The doctrine was again well applied in a rather recent case, Jennings v.
Vincent's AdM x. ' Here a building was being insulated with a known and well
marked highly inflamable plastic liquid. Workmen were carrying it in open
buckets near an open flame. A flame shot out, ran along the ceiling of the
building, and an explosion occurred. After an excellent discussion of the doctrine,
the court determined that this work was not inherently dangerous if done properly.
The injury can be attributed only to the negligence of the workmen in trans-
porting this substance so close to the flame. It was not necessary to the work
to do this.
Excavations in the course of building have provided another field for appli-
cation of the inherently dangerous undertaking doctrine. Although many of the
cases, especially the older ones, have been decided on the basis of a nuisance,
many times they could have been handled within the doctrine under discussion.
Such a case is Matheny v. Wolfs."  There, an excavation had been made right
up to the edge of a street in Louisville. No barricades or lights had been put
in place. A pedestrian was catapulted into the excavation when the street sub-
sided beneath him. A decision for the employer was reversed and the case re-
manded so that the jury could pass upon the question of danger. The court
made a pertinent distinction between an excavation at the edge of a public way
and one farther back upon the lot.
Of course, it may perhaps be arguable that the catastrophe that was so
probable under these circumstances was that someone would fall into the excava-
tion, not be thrown into it because of a subsidence. Nevertheless, the excavation
was eight feet deep and a subsidence under the facts of a public sidewalk and
numerous passersby is probable.
The employer was not held responsible in another excavation case, L. & N.
R. R. Co. v. Smith's Admr.:' Here, an employee of the contractor was killed in
a cave-in while working on a new culvert beneath the railroad tracks. The cave-in
resulted, not from the tracks themselves which were properly supported, not from
the tracks themselves which were properly supported, but from the excavation
itself. The court said that the work had some danger, as did all diggings, but
that the independent contractor was experienced and by use of proper slant aild
supports, a cave-in was not likely. If the work had been done properly, a cave-in
would not have happened. But in another somewhat similar case, the employing
city was held responsible.'
A final illustration of this phase, City of Covington v. Parsons,' is not really
in point but is related and rather interesting. There, the city employed an
independent contractor to put in a sewer. The contractor did so according to
the city s plans, but the excavating caused the plaintiffs land to fall, resulting in
3'284 Ky. 614, 145 S.W 2d 537 (1940).
6 Ky. 137 (1865).
134 Ky. 47, 119 S.W 241 (1909).
E. R. Harding Co. v. Paducah Street R. Co.. 208 Ky. 728, 271 S.W 1016 (1925);
-1so, see Briggs v. Klosse, 5 Ind. App. 129, 31 N.E. 208 (1892).
;"258 Ky, 22, 79 S.W 2d 353 (1935).
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damage to his house. The plaintiff recovered from the city under Section 242
of the Kentucky Constitution, which provides for compensation for the taking of
private property for a public use. The court reiterated that although the general
rule is that the employer is not responsible for the acts of an independent con-
tractor, yet there was no rule whereby a public agency, or others vested with the
power of eminent domain, will be relieved of liability under Section 242 of the
Constitution, even though the act may be done by an independent contractor,
or even whether the act was negligently or prudently done. '
There are other instances more common in day to day life and business
where the employer is not so likely to be held liable. A store owner contracted
with a teamster to make deliveries for him. While doing so, a servant of the
teamster left the horse untied; it became frightened, ran down the street, and
hit and killed the plaintiff's intestate. The store owner was not liable." Similarly,
in a case where a garage man had picked up the defendant's car and, while
driving it to the garage to make repairs on it for the defendant, had hit the plain-
tiff, the car owner was not held responsible." The same result was reached when
the servants of an independent contractor, while unloading a spool of wire from
a freight car, caused it to tip over on the plaintiff breaking his leg.' In
General Refractories Company v. Mozser,' the contractor buried powder in the
ground. Unbeknown to the contractor, a small boy behind a clump of bushes
saw this, dug it up, and a few days later a playmate was burned to death when
a third playmate dropped a match into the powder. No liability attached to the
employer even if the contractor were negligent.
The court in American Car & Foundry Co. v. Spears" found for the plaintiff
on the nuisance and trespass theories. However, it is thought that the result
should quite likely have been the same by application of the inherently dangerous
undertaking doctrine. In this case, a stream flowed through the plaintiff's farm
land. The employer had a dam up stream and engaged a contractor to operate
the dam, open the flood gates to flood the channel below, and thereby float out
logs. Upon this occasion the plaintiffs land was washed away and fencing and
crops destroyed. It is submitted that when one turns water and logs loose, no
longer under control, damage is a highly probable result. Such damage as this
could very well be called a highly probable result of this undertaking."
The felling of trees has not been generally deemed inherently dangerous.'"
In Yellow Creek Coal Co. v. Lawson" the employer had a contractor engaged in
cutting trees. The timber lands bordered a school yard. One day after school
hours the contractor felled a tree which fell against an electric wire causing it
Accord, City of Cumberland v. Central Baptist Church of Cuinberland, 305
Ky. 282, 203 S.W. 2d 57 (1947).
4 5Jahn's Admr. v. Wm. H. McKnight & Co., 117 Ky. 655, 78 S.W 862 (1904).
41 Stamper v. Jesse, 199 Ky. 324, 250 S.W 1008 (1923).
42"Structure Oil Company v. Chambers, 208 Ky. 30, 270 S.W 458 (1925).
4-1 235 Ky. 252, 30 S.W 2d 952 (1980).
4 146 Ky. 736, 143 S.W 377 (1912).
15 Cf. Town of Pierrepont v. Loveless, 72 N. Y. 211 (1878) (where floating logs
downstream was held not to be inherently dangerous. But in this case the streani
was being used as it was found and was not augmented by opening flood gates.
Also, there were emnplovees stationed along the way to control the logs).4
1Young v. Fosburg Lumber Co., 147 N. C. 26, 60 S.E. 654, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.)
255 (1908).
" 229 Ky. 245, 16 S.V,,2d 1043 (1929).
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to sag. The next morning a school child was injured when lie came in contact
with the wire. The Coal Company was held not liable for the injuries caused by
the contractor s negligence.
Work wherein blasting is done may perhaps be the ripest field in which an
employer cannot shed his responsibility. A contractor, building a house in Har-
rodsburg, was excavating for a basement in the ordinary manner of blasting.
The plaintiff's intestate, not a worker, was hurt. On appeal by the plaintiff, the
judgment was reversed and the cause remanded, the case to be submitted to the
jury on principles of a nuisance.'" However, there is no reason for not believing
that the doctrine could be well applied. There must have been houses and/or
people in the vicinity of the undertaking, or else there would have been no
inusance. This being so, and from the nature of the work, one cannot say that
it was not inherently dangerous."'
In Pine Mowitam R. Co. v. Finley,' the railroad employed a contractor to
build a road bed. Blasting was necessitated and great quantities of earth were
thrown upon the plaintiff's farm land. The court stated that blasting is known
to be attended wvith the great danger that earth and rocks will be thrown con-
siderable distances. Where it was known to the railroad that blasting was
necessary on its road bed, the railroad was bound to know that earth and rocks
would be thrown upon the plaintiff's land lying adjacent to the right of way and
separated from it only by a narrow river. Under such circumstances, the railroad
cannot escape liability by turning the work over to an independent contractor.
In this ease it was not prejudicial error for the trial judge to take the question
from the jury and say as a matter of law that the undertaking was so hazardous
and the probability of injury to the adjoining property so certain that the railroad
cannot escape liability because the work was being done by an independent
contradtor. The court was of the opinion that this was not a case in which this
.should be done but nevertheless felt that the railroad was not prejudiced by the
trial judge having taken it from the jurv.
The concluding case ' is one in which the contractor was not held responsible
for the negligence of a subcontractor under the peculiar circumstances of the case.
A new highway culvert was to be constructed 200 feet from the plaintiffs house.
The sub-contractor removed an old culvert by means of dynamite. (It is not clear
that it was in the same spot where the new one was to be built.) An excessive
amount was used, and the plaintiffs house was damaged. The contractor was
not held liable because if a reasonable amount had been used, sufficient for the
".lame, \dn r. v. M*cJlimmi. 93 Kv. 471, 20 S.W 435 (1892).
" People v. Clemente. 130 N. Y. Supp. 612 (1911), aff'd, 207 N. Y. 682, 101 N.E.
II1 (1911) where the contractor himself was convicted of manslaughter under
•imilar crcumstances.
" 17 S.W 413, 416 (Ky. 1909).
- Irceord, Lexington & Eastern Railway Co. v. Baker, 156 Ky. 431, 161 S.V. 228
(1913) (where the court, remanding the case for a new trial, said that if a relation-
ship of independent contractor were found, the railroad would be liable for blasting
200 feet from the plaintiff's residence if the blasting were necessary in the execution
of the contract and such as would naturally and probably result in damage to the
plaintiff's property).
" Harris v. Stone, 256 Kv. 737 77 S.W 2d 18 (1934).
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work, the damage would not have happened. Here it was solely the negligence
of the sub-contractor and not the work itself which caused the damage.'
However, it is thought that the ise of dynamite entails very grave risks.
Even where what is thought to be a proper charge is used, the results cannot
always be predicted. Blasting is a dangerous undertaking under almost all
circumstances; the great probability of harm resulting is recognized. It is not
suggested -that strict liability be imposed upon the one contracting to have
blasting done. It is suggested only that in the case of blasting a careful scrutiny
be made of the surrounding circumstances of the specific case before it is de-
cided that the particular blasting would only possibly result in harm raffier than
be of that highly probable nature requisite to impose liability on the employer.
To recapitulate, we find that the general rule is that an employer is not
liable for the acts of his independent contractor. This rule has several exceptions
when the employer will be liable; one of these involves work which is inherently
dangerous.
The word "probable" is perhaps the chief word to keep in mind in deter-
minimng what is inherently dangerous. A possible harm resulting from the work
is not enough; harm as a substantial certainty is too much. Also, the harm must
result directly from the work itself or from the required manner of doing it. The
employer will not be liable when the harm has its origin elsewhere.
Then, tias question is not to -be resolved in a vacuum; the answer is to be
reached in the fresh air of all the surrounding circumstances of the particular
case, good common sense, and the help which decided cases will be able to give.
RiCHARD G. BELL
Cf. Holt v. Texas-New Mexico Pipeline Co., 145 F. 2d 862 (C. C. A. 5th 1914),
cert. denied, 325 U. S. 879, 65 Sup. Ct. 1570, 89 L. Ed. 1996 (1945) (where dynamiting
was held not to be inherently dangerous because the work was being done in a bar-
ren. rural section. Also, the injury did not result directly from the nature of the
work but from an act purely collateral to the work. The dynamiting had been done
the day before, but the contractor had failed to inspect for unexploded dviiamtte
although it was customary to do so. The next day the plaintiff, a workman, dig.
gmg in the area, was hurt when his pick struck a dynamite cap causing the ex-
plosion that injured him).
